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I. INTRODUCTION
The Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) has always taken a
deferential stance with regard to the practice of medicine, and maintains
that it will not interfere with the physicians’ autonomy in this regard.
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This is otherwise known as the “practice of medicine exception.”
However, the reality is that it is often difficult to draw a clear line between
the role of FDA in safeguarding the public from unsafe drugs and the
autonomy that physicians have in prescribing off-label medication in the
practice of medicine.
This article first will first define what constitutes the “practice of
medicine” and outline the deferential stance position that the FDA has
adopted towards this practice. This is supported by a discussion of the
legal basis for this deferential stance, a position that Congress has also
reiterated over the years. The article then explores the prevailing attitudes
of physicians and patients toward off-label drugs, current regulations
pertaining to the prescription and advertising of off-label drugs, and
recent cases that look into restriction of advertising and promoting of offlabel uses of drugs. Next, the article dives into a balanced and in-depth
discussion as to whether the FDA should regulate the use of off-label
drugs, even if it means potentially encroaching and infringing the
boundaries of the practice of medicine exception. Lastly, the article sets
out brief recommendations that may help address the dilemma.
II. FDA AND THE PRACTICE OF MEDICINE
A. Defining the “Practice of Medicine”
Before plunging into a meaningful discussion of the interaction
between the FDA and the practice of medicine, it is first appropriate to
define what the “practice of medicine” encompasses.
What exactly is the “practice of medicine?” Is the “practice of
medicine” whatever that the physicians say it is, or is it a question of how
to properly treat patients? If it is the former, then the “practice of
medicine” clearly lies within the prerogative of physicians and is a field
in which regulatory bodies have no role intruding upon. If it is the latter,
then in the name of safeguarding the public health, perhaps there is some
foundation for the government to intervene and impose regulations.
It naturally follows that the definition of “practice of medicine” that
this paper chooses to adopt will influence all of the arguments
subsequently raised. However, there is no clear uniform answer: the
definitions of “practice of medicine” have fluctuated over time, states and
jurisdictions. For instance, an article in the Journal of American Medical
Association in 1908 defined the practice of medicine simply as the “art
of healing,” while at the same time, states like New York and Ohio only
considered that an individual practiced medicine if he administered drugs
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or performed surgery.1
Modern legal definitions do not provide much clarity, with different
states reaching different conclusions on whether the same activity
involves the practice of medicine. For example, the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals considers a physician’s testimony as a non-treating
expert witness to fall under the umbrella of the practice of medicine.2 The
Missouri Court of Appeals however, takes the opposite stance.3
Therefore, it is difficult to reach a uniform position on certain activities,
and states and courts have also grappled with defining and delineating the
boundaries of the practice of medicine. For instance, it is unclear if
physicians can rightfully claim to engage in the practice of medicine
when they review insurance coverage decisions or when non-physicians,
whose duties overlap with actual physicians, can be said to cross the line
into practicing medicine.4
Generally, most state statutes and courts broadly define the practice
of medicine as involving at least two activities: (1) diagnosing a disease,
condition or injury; and (2) prescribing, administering or providing a
treatment for that disease, condition or injury. 5
B. Legal Basis for the Non-Interference with the Practice of
Medicine
The FDA has always been clear on its stance: it does not regulate
the practice of medicine between physicians and patients.6 Although
there are no existing statutes that specifically outline or guide this
prohibition, the FDA’s deference to physicians is borne from
Congressional intent.
The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938 (“FFDCA”)
provides the primary source of FDA’s regulatory power over drugs.
Although the FFDCA, in effect, expanded the federal regulatory
1 What Constitutes the Practice of Medicine, 299 JAMA 463, 463 (2008); Smith v.
Lane, 31 N.Y. Sup. Ct. (24 Hun 632) 634-35 (1881); see also Nelson v. State Bd. of Health,
57 S.W. 501, 505 (Ky. 1900) (holding that an osteopath is not required to be licensed because
he does not “prescribe or administer medicine or perform surgery”); State v. Liffring, 55 N.E.
168, 168-69 (Ohio 1899) (concluding that a treatment is not medical practice unless it includes
the administration of drugs).
2 See Joseph v. D.C. Bd. of Med., 587 A.2d 1085, 1091 (D.C. 1991).
3 See Missouri Bd. of Registration for the Healing Arts v. Levine, 808 S.W.2d 440, 443
(Mo. Ct. App. 1991).
4 Lars Noah, Ambivalent Commitments to Federalism in Controlling the Practice of
Medicine, 53 KAN. L. REV. 149, 162-64 (2004).
5 Noah, supra note 4, at 162; Cynthia Marietta & Amy L. McGuire, Direct-to-Consumer
Genetic Testing: Is It the Practice of Medicine?, 37 J. L. MED. AND ETHICS, 369, 371 (2009).
6
Carol Berry, The Dividing Line Between the Role of the FDA and the Practice of
Medicine: A Historical Review and Current Analysis, HARV. UNIV. LIBRARY (1997).
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authority, the legislative debates preceding the enactment of the FFDCA
demonstrated that Congress had never intended for FDA to regulate the
practice of medicine.7
During the course of amending the FFDCA in passing the Drug
Amendments of 1962, Congress once again repeated their stance of
FDA’s non-interference with the practice of medicine.8 In subsequent
amendments, provisions were included to reinforce this stance. Section
214 of the Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997
states that “nothing in [the FFDCA] shall be construed to limit or interfere
with the authority of a healthcare practitioner to prescribe or administer
any legally marketed device to a patient for any condition or disease
within a legitimate health care practitioner-patient relationship.”9
Furthermore, the Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of
2007 explicates that “nothing in this section shall be construed to. . .limit
the practice of medicine.”10 Evidently, this doctrine has been reiterated
throughout the years, and it is important to note that Congress has adopted
a similarly deferential stance in protecting professional autonomy in other
federal healthcare legislation, such as the Medicare statute, Fertility
Success Rate and Certification Act of 1992 and the Drug Addiction
Treatment Act of 2000.11
7 See ROBERT P. BRADY, FUNDAMENTALS OF LAW & REGULATION: AN IN-DEPTH LOOK
FOOD & DRUG ADMINISTRATION MODERNIZATION ACT 423-424 (David G. Adams &
Richard M. Cooper eds., 1st ed. 1997); see also Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531
U.S. 341, 350 (2001) (“[T]he FDA’s mission [is to] . . . regulate . . . without directly
interfering with the practice of medicine”); James M. Beck & Elizabeth D. Azari, FDA, OffLabel Use, and Informed Consent: Debunking Myths and Misconceptions, 53 FOOD & DRUG
L.J. 71, 76 (1998) (“[The] FDA never has had authority to regulate the practice of medicine;
physicians may use legally marketed drugs or devices in any way that they believe, in their
professional judgment, will best serve their patients”).
8 Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780 (codified in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.). See S.
Rep. No. 87-1552, at 1998 (1962) (“[T]he . . . [Act] should not interfere with the professional
function of the physician. FDA clearance would assure physicians that a drug effectively
produces certain physiological actions, but the physician, not the FDA, would determine
whether these specific physiological effects would be useful or beneficial with respect to
particular patients.”).
9 Pub. L. No. 105-115, § 214, 111 Stat. 2296, 2348 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 396).
10 Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-85, §
1111(d), 121 Stat. 823, 976 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 247d-5a(d)).
11 Health Insurance for the Aged Act, Pub. L. No. 89-97, § 102(a), 79 Stat. 290, 291
(1965) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395) (“Nothing in [the Medicare statute] shall be construed
to authorize any Federal officer or employee to exercise any supervision or control over the
practice of medicine.”); Pub. L. No. 102-493, § 3(i)(1),106 Stat. 3146, 3149 (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 263a-2(i)(1)) (“In developing the [federal embryo laboratory] certification program,
the [Department of Health and Human Services] may not establish any regulation, standard,
or requirement which has the effect of exercising supervision or control over the practice of
medicine in assisted reproductive technology programs.”); Pub. L. No. 106-310, § 3502, 114
Stat. 1222, 1226 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 823(g)(2)(H)(i)) (“Nothing in such regulations or

AT
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C. The Dilemma that the FDA Faces
Not surprisingly, there exists an apparent tension between respecting
physicians’ autonomy in caring for individuals in their practice of
medicine and the need for the government to regulate such practices and
safeguard public health. A common viewpoint amongst physicians is that
flexibility is crucial for them to judge what is best for each individual
patient and to provide effective medical care of the highest quality. 12 The
focus of ethical medical teaching has always been to do what is in the
best interest of the individual patient and to respect each patient’s
autonomy. In contrast, the focus with the study of medicine in public
health lies on the well-being of the entire population at large.13 As Jeffrey
Drazen—a physician and editor-in-chief of the New England Journal of
Medicine—pointed out, the practice of medicine is done “on an
individual basis, with the best interests of the patient foremost in the
practitioner’s mind.”14
The tension between the FDA and physicians over the scope of
practice of medicine has led to various clashes in the field, such as the
use of pre-approved medical devices or autologous stem cell therapies.
In the latter, the FDA determined in 2008 that the autologous stem cell
therapies performed by Regenerative Sciences (a Colorado-based
medical practice and its physician owners) constituted a “drug” under
section 201(g) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (“FFDCA”)
and a “biological product” under section 351(i) of the Public Health
Service Act (“PHSA”).15 This move expanded the scope of FDA’s
regulatory authority over physicians working on stem cell research and
treatment.
This paper will focus closely and solely on the tension and
controversy generated by the use of off-label drugs by physicians.

practice guidelines may authorize any Federal official or employee to exercise supervision or
control over the practice of medicine or the manner in which medical services are provided.”).
12 Solomon J, Raynor DK, Knapp P, Atkin K, The Compatibility of Prescribing
Guidelines and The Doctor-Patient Relationship: A Primary Care Mixed-Methods Study, 62
BR J GEN PRACT. 275, 275 (2012).
13 BERNARD LO, RESOLVING ETHICAL DILEMMAS: A GUIDE FOR CLINICIANS 12–14 (5th
ed. 2013); see also LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: POWER, DUTY, RESTRAINT
(2nd ed. 2008).
14 Jeffrey M. Drazen, Government in Medicine, 356 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2195, 2195
(2007).
15
Letter from Mary A. Malarkey, Dir. of Compliance and Biologics Quality, U.S. Food
& Drug Admin., to Christopher J. Centeno, M.D., Med. Dir., Regenerative Sci., Inc. (July 25,
2008), available at http://www.fda.gov/BiologicsBloodVaccines/GuidanceCompliance
RegulatoryInformation/ComplianceActivities/Enforcement/UntitledLetters/ucm091991.htm.
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III. OFF-LABEL DRUGS
With respect to the use of off-label drugs, it is crucial to note that
this tug-of-war over the scope of practice of medicine goes beyond the
FDA and physicians; there are other important stakeholders deeply
involved with vested and personal interests. Third party payers
increasingly question their duty to expend payments for drugs that have
not been proven reliably effective, even if these drugs may be the only
viable treatment option available.16 Pharmaceutical companies are
interested in expanding their markets and increasing profits by bypassing
expensive by bypassing expensive clinical trials needed for FDA
approval.17 The consumers, i.e., the public at large, wants to know that
drugs that are available in the market are supported by clinical evidence
and are sold at affordable prices.18 The FDA, being responsible for
matters that affect the nation’s health and welfare, has an obligation to try
and balance these seemingly incompatible goals. In view of these
conflicting and contradictory interests, where should the line be drawn?
Before examining the interests of these parties and the weight of the
arguments for and against regulation of the use of off-label drugs, it
makes sense to first gain a better understanding of the current state of
affairs by looking at the current regulations and recent legal cases about
the use of such drugs.
A. What Does “Off-Label” Mean?
The FDA acts on behalf of the federal government and is responsible
for regulating the entry, sale, promotions, and marketing of drugs in
United States. The relevant statute that guides this process is the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, which was first enacted in 1938 and
underwent a series of amendments in 1962. The FFDCA stipulates a
“preclearance” regulatory system, which states that “[n]o person shall
introduce or deliver for introduction into interstate commerce any new
drug, unless an approval of an application . . . is effective with respect to
such drug.”19 The approval process for a new drug is long, arduous, and
highly expensive, involving numerous phases of testing on animals and
humans.
The FDA only allows new drugs to enter the marketplace for the
Randall Stafford, Regulating Off-Label Drug Use – Rethinking The Role of The FDA,
358 NEW ENG. J. OF MED. 1427, 1428 (2008).
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (2012). See also Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, Pub. L.
No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040, 1043 (1938), amended by Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No.
87-781, 76 Stat. 780 (1962) (current version at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-399f).
16
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uses that the pharmaceutical company has applied and managed to get
approval for.20 Moreover, given that the FDA is also responsible for
regulating the advertising of such drugs by pharmaceutical companies, it
requires that all of the approved uses be indicated on a drug’s label.21
“Off-label” uses of a drug refer to the use or prescription of the drug in a
manner that has not been authorized by the FDA through its approval
process for new drugs.
B. Use of Off-Label Prescription Drugs
Off-label use can arise in different ways, but it mainly refers to the
use of drugs in ways that have not been approved by the FDA. Drugs can
be used for an unapproved indication. For example, the antipsychotic
agent, quetiapine, is approved for treating psychosis, but can also be
prescribed for different medical conditions like depression. They can
also be used in unapproved populations, like paroxetine, that is approved
for treating depression in adults, but is are also used to treat depression in
children.22 Other ways of using drugs in an off-label manner is to
prescribe them in a non-approved dosage form or dose regimen.23
Physicians use drugs for indications outside of the approved uses when
they extend the use of approved drugs to milder forms of an approved
indication, or a closely related condition (e.g., the use of anti-asthmatic
montelukast (commonly known as Singulair) for chronic obstructive
pulmonary disease), or other conditions which have similar physiological
pathways (e.g., the use of the antidiabetic drug metformin to treat
polycystic ovarian syndrome) or to conditions that have similar and
overlapping symptoms.24
Off-label prescribing is legal and is so common that it can be found
in almost every field of modern medicine. In a recent study done in 2006,
off-label use was shown to account for approximately twenty-one percent
of all prescriptions of 160 common drugs.25
The most common medical fields in which off-label drugs are being
prescribed are oncology, rare diseases, AIDS treatment, and pediatrics;
while the highest rates of off-label use were for anticonvulsants (seventyfour percent), antipsychotics (sixty percent), and antibiotics (forty

20

Rodney Smolla, Off-Label Drug Advertising and The First Amendment, 50 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 81 (2015).
21 21 U.S.C. § 321(p)(1) (2016).
22 Stafford, supra note 16, at 1427.
23 Stafford, supra note 16, at 1427.
24 Stafford, supra note 16, at 1427.
25 David C. Radley, Stan N. Finkelstein & Randall Stafford, Off-Label Prescribing
Among Office-Based Physicians, 166(9) ARCHIVES OF INT’L MED 1021 (2006).
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percent).26 In 1911, the General Accounting Office found that twentyfive percent of all anticancer drugs were prescribed off-label and fifty-six
percent of cancer patients were on at least one drug that was being
prescribed off-label.27 In the field of pediatric medicine, it has been
estimated that sixty-two percent of drugs prescribed for children are for
off-label uses.28
The use of off-label drugs is so ubiquitous that, not only are they
being used in most medical specialties, they can be part of guidelinerecommended practices, including in the use of aspirin in diabetes for
prophylaxis against cardiovascular disease, and can even be a first-line
therapy in some cases, such as the use of gabapentin for painful diabetic
neuropathy, in addition to its approved use in the treatment of herpes
zoster. Some drugs that pose a high risk of side effects, even for their
approved uses, are also being used off-label as a last resort, e.g., the use
of tacrolimus for autoimmune disease, in addition to its approved use in
transplantation.29
C. Current Regulations Pertaining to Off-Label Drugs
Broadly speaking, off-label activities can take three basic forms: offlabel use by consumers at large who purchase these drugs over the
counter, off-label prescription of drugs by physicians and providers, and
off-label marketing and promotion by pharmaceutical companies.30 In
general, off-label prescribing largely influences off-label use by
consumers, which is in turn influenced greatly by off-label advertising
and promotion to physicians. The FDA has sought to regulate and restrict
the extent of off-label use, mainly by restricting the pharmaceutical
industry’s marketing practices and, to a much smaller extent, prescribing
by physicians.31 This unique behavior is presumably driven by the FDA’s
deferential stance toward the practice of medicine exception, although it
is debatable whether interfering with the industry’s attempts to promote
off-label uses to physicians is in effect an indirect interference with the
practice of medicine.
26 Stafford, supra note 16, at 1427; James O’Reilly and Amy Dalal, Off-Label or Out of
Bounds? Prescriber and Marketer Liability for Unapproved Uses of FDA-Approved Drugs,
12 ANNALS OF HEALTH L. 295, 298 (2003).
27 U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/PEMD-91-14, OFF-LABEL DRUGS:
REIMBURSEMENT POLICIES CONSTRAIN PHYSICIANS IN THEIR CHOICE OF CANCER THERAPIES
(1991).
28 Alicia T.F. Bazzano et al., Off-Label Prescribing to Children in the United States
Outpatient Setting, 9 ACAD. PEDIATRICS 81, 83 (2009).
29 Stafford, supra note 16, at 1427.
30
O’Reilly and Amy Dalal, supra note 26.
31 Stafford, supra note 16, at 1428.
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With regard to prescribing off-label uses, the FDA uses changes in
drug labeling such as black box warnings to alert physicians that special
caution is required, and imposes specific restrictions on drug availability
to curb off-label uses to limited settings.32 The FDA imposes much
stricter rules on the industry’s marketing practices. Prior to its 1997
amendments, the FFDCA expressly forbade the sale of a drug that has
unapproved uses written on its label or was advertised for unapproved
uses.33 In other words, pharmaceutical companies were only allowed to
promote or advertise prescription drugs for uses that were approved by
the FDA or uses that were “on” the new drug’s label.
Following major lobbying from pharmaceutical companies, the
FFDCA underwent a series of amendments in 1997. Section 401 of the
FDA’s Modernization Act allows drug manufacturers to distribute
information regarding the off-label use, on the condition that the
manufacturer satisfies a list of requirements.34 These requirements
include only disseminating information that is not abridged, false,
misleading, or posing a significant health risk to the public; the
manufacturer has to conduct all clinical research found in the
disseminated materials, and include in all disseminated materials
prominent disclaimers clarifying that the information disclosed concerns
a drug that has not been approved by the FDA for that particular use.35
The medical industry has always welcomed the exchange of
scientific information with the drug industry and preferred the open
dissemination of truthful, non-misleading information relating to all
beneficial uses for approved products.36 In fact, both the pharmaceutical
industry and the medical professions believe that the FDA’s regulations
encroach upon their freedom of speech and freedom to practice medicine
respectively, and hinder them from keeping up with medical
breakthroughs and scientific discoveries.37
D. Off-Label Drugs and the First Amendment
Given that the full exchange of drug-related information between
pharmaceutical companies and physicians influences the latter’s medical
knowledge, it follows that pharmaceutical companies’ freedom of speech

32

Stafford, supra note 16, at 1428.
See 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(a), 331(d), 321(p) (2000).
34 Pub. L. No. 105-115, § 401, 111 Stat. at 2356-57 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 360a).
35 Id.
36 Katherine Helm, Protecting Public Health from Outside the Physician’s Office: A
Century of FDA Regulation From Drug Safety Labeling to Off-Label Drug Promotion, 18
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA AND ENT. L. J. 1177, 153-55 (2007).
37 Id. at 153-54.
33
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is intimately linked to physicians’ freedom to practice medicine. Hence,
in examining the FDA’s possible interference with the practice of
medicine, we also need to look at how it might do so indirectly by
restricting the freedom of speech.
First Amendment challenges to the FDA’s ban on off-label
promotion have been raised on the grounds that it restricts the freedom of
speech. There are two recent cases that directly impacted the
constitutionality of the FDA’s authority. In Sorell v. IMS Health, the U.S.
Supreme Court held that a Vermont law that restricted the “sale,
disclosure, and use of pharmacy recordsFalsereveal[ing] the prescribing
practices of individual doctors” violated First Amendment free speech
protections.38 To reduce state healthcare costs, Vermont intended to
hinder drug manufacturers’ ability to use the information gained from the
prescribing practices of doctors to influence them to prescribe brandname drugs instead of generic equivalents.39 The Supreme Court
explicitly stated that “[s]peech in aid of pharmaceutical marketing. . . is
a form of expression protected by the Free Speech Clause of the First
Amendment” and that Vermont sought “to achieve its policy objectives
through the indirect means of restraining certain speech by certain
speakers – that is, by diminishing detailers’ ability to influence
prescription decisions.”40 The court in Sorell stated, “the ‘fear that people
would make bad decisions if given truthful information’ cannot justify
content–based burdens on speech.”41 The court noted that the First
Amendment’s hostility to paternalistic regulations is applied with “full
force, when the audience, in this case prescribing physicians, consists of
‘sophisticated and experienced’ consumers,” which is the same audience
of the off-label promotions that the FDA is attempting to restrict.42
Although the Sorrell holding examined pharmaceutical marketing
and not specifically at the FDA regulatory authority to regulate off-label
promotion, it predicted how courts would decide the FDA’s ability to
restrict manufacturers from providing truthful information to physicians
about off-label uses of approved drugs.43
This prediction came to fruition in the Second Circuit decision,
United States v. Caronia, where a pharmaceutical company, and its

38

Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 557 (2011).
Id. at 560-61.
40 Id. at 557, 577.
41 Id. at 577.
42 Id.
43 Ashley Zborowsky, Rethinking Off-Label Regulation in The Wake of Sorrell v. IMS
Health: Can State Involvement Compensate for Waning State Authority to Curb Commercial
Free Speech?, 13 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 925, 934 (2012).
39
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marketing agents, were caught promoting statements based on their
personal experiences on the off-label uses of the prescription drug
Xyrem.44 Given that the statements made by the defendants were truthful
and not false or misleading, the issue in Caronia revolves purely around
the legality of the FDA’s restrictions on the act of off-label marketing
itself.45 At the time Caronia was decided, the key case on commercial
speech protections was Central Hudson Gas and Electric Corp. v Public
Service Commission, where the Supreme Court created a four-part test:
(1) whether the expression is protected by the First Amendment and for
commercial speech to fall under this category it must concern lawful
activity and not be misleading; (2) whether the asserted governmental
interest is substantial; (3) whether the regulation directly advances the
governmental interest asserted; and (4) whether it is not more extensive
than is necessary to serve that interest.46
Accordingly, in Caronia the Second Circuit applied the fourpronged commercial speech test set out in Central Hudson.47
Consequently, the court found that the speech concerned lawful activity
and was not misleading under the first prong and that the FDA’s interest
in safeguarding public safety and health was “substantial” under the
second prong, but the FDA’s regulatory regime failed to advance the
governmental interest in a direct and material way under the third prong.48
Further, the court found that the regulation is broader than necessary to
serve the interest under the fourth prong.49 The Court pointed out that,
“prohibiting off-label promotion . . . while simultaneously allowing offlabel use ‘paternistically’ interferes with the ability of physicians and
patients to receive potentially relevant treatment information . . . [which]
could inhibit, to the public’s detriment, informed and intelligent treatment
decisions.”50
In holding that the restricting commercial speech should be a last
resort under the First Amendment, the court in Caronia dealt a blow to
the FDA’s authority to restrict off-label marketing, thereby
compromising the FDA’s authority to use commercial speech as a proxy
to regulate undesirable off-label prescriptions.51 The Court’s decision in
44

Unites States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 156-57 (2d Cir. 2012).
Id. at 165.
46 Central Hudson, Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566
(1980).
47 Unites States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 164-66 (2d Cir. 2012).
48 Id. at 166.
49 Id. at 165-67.
50 Id. at 166.
51 Zborowsky, supra note 43, at 937; Rodney Smolla, Off- Label Drug Advertising and
The First Amendment, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 81, 110 (2015).
45
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Caronia brings the FDA closer to confronting its dilemma: how can it
balance its role in safeguarding public health without interfering with
physicians’ autonomy to freely practice medicine?
IV. SHOULD THE FDA REGULATE THE USE OF OFF-LABEL DRUGS?
Should the FDA regulate the use of off-label drugs in the name of
public safety, but at the risk of interfering with the practice of medicine,
which may in turn also endanger public health? As Helm points out, the
“double-edged sword of drug regulation can cut deeply both ways.”52
A. Arguments for Regulations
There are various reasons for which the FDA should take on a more
active role in regulating off-label uses. For starters, in view of the
conflicting interests of different stakeholders, one can argue that it is the
role of the FDA as a federal regulatory body to step in to balance these
interests.53 Interests such as increasing access and availability can be at
odds with ensuring safety and efficacy.54
There is also a highly worrying possibility that pharmaceutical
companies may shun the expensive and complicated approval process by
“gaming the system.”55 Equipped with the knowledge that they can sell
their products for a wide range of uses once a singular use has been
approved, drug companies will choose to seek approval for narrow
indications. The relevant clinical trials for narrow indications are less
expensive and tedious, and they do so with the hope that they can gain
approval faster and market the product for both its approved and
unapproved uses.56 In the short term, patients will be placed at risk of
being harmed by drugs that are being used for purposes that have not been
proven to be safe and effective.57 In the long run, the underhanded
shortcuts adopted by pharmaceutical companies to bypass the FDA’s
strict review and approval process severely undermines the drug efficacy
requirements, which may end up chipping away at the foundation of
evidence-based medicine.58
Save for regulations imposed by the FDA on off-label prescription
and promotion, drug companies also have minimal incentives to expend
time, money, and resources to prove the safety and efficacy of the
52
53
54
55
56
57
58

Helm, supra note 36, at 167.
Stafford, supra note 16, at 1427.
Helm, supra note 36, at 163-64.
Stafford, supra note 16, at 1427-28.
Helm, supra note 36, at 164.
O’ Reilly and Dalal, supra note 26, at 307.
Stafford, supra note 16, at 1427.

TEO - MACRO - 7.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

FDA AND THE PRACTICE OF MEDICINE

9/5/2017 3:30 PM

317

unindicated uses.59 Generic drugs are often produced by smaller
pharmaceutical firms that do not have the capital or financial backing to
pay for the expenses that are required to push a drug through the new drug
application process. Brand-name drugs that are already widely used offlabel are rarely put through the process by pharmaceutical companies that
can afford the trials, simply because carrying out such expensive trials
could potentially end up producing clinical evidence that does not support
the unapproved use and thus subjects the companies to suffering from
loss of profits.60 Competing drug manufacturers are also less inclined to
carry out research about the safety of their own drugs when they see other
manufacturers making sales from similar drugs sold for the same
unindicated use, especially since doing research will only lead to lost
sales from creating delays.61 Thus, there is an obvious need for the FDA
to step in to impose regulatory control, as market forces provide
insufficient incentives for drug companies to protect their consumers.62
Another potential concern is that it would be wholly irresponsible to
leave it to the pharmaceutical industry and physicians to dictate the use
of drugs, when pharmaceutical companies have minimal incentives to
monitor the safety and efficacy of the drugs and individual physicians do
not have the resources to carry out the extensive and expensive trials
needed to reliably and accurately prove its efficacy. In fact, the trials
reported in the materials that pharmaceutical companies distribute to
physicians to convince them of the efficacy of off-label uses are often of
poor quality, industry-sponsored, and are compared to placebos rather
than existing approved therapies.63 With minimal incentives to drive the
pursuit of reliable, controlled data on the efficacy of drugs for new
indications, physicians run the risk of making treatment choices that are
unsafe.64
This is especially important as the average consumer expects the
FDA to have thoroughly screened and evaluated every drug that is
available in the market for drug safety and efficacy, which is in line with
the common expectation that FDA is irrefutably responsible for
safeguarding public health and safety. By permitting off-label uses to
occur without subjecting the drugs to rigorous safety checks, the FDA is
undermining the expectations of the average consumer.65 As Public
59
60
61
62
63
64
65

Stafford, supra note 16, at 1427.
Stafford, supra note 16, at 1427.
O’Reilly and Dalal, supra note 26, at 307.
O’Reilly and Dalal, supra note 26, at 309.
Stafford, supra note 16, at 1428.
Helm, supra note 36, at 167.
Stafford, supra note 16, at 1428.
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Citizen, a consumer watchdog group, asserted in a congressional
submission, deregulating the drug companies will “place the economic
well–being of multinational pharmaceutical manufacturers above the
health and safety of the American public and. . .weaken [the] law meant
to protect the public from needless drug – induced injury.”66 Besides, if
serious safety concerns about approved uses for drugs already on the
market are constantly being raised, surely that equates to even more cause
for concern when it comes to off-label uses that have not gone through
the rigorous testing process.
In 2006, a study revealed that 73 percent of off–label prescriptions
lacked any “firm scientific evidence.”67 This may be driven in part by
the fact that physicians may hold wrong or inaccurate beliefs of the level
of evidence supporting a drug’s indications. A survey done by the
University of Chicago Medical Centre revealed that physicians were
more likely to (incorrectly) believe that a specific use of a drug was FDA–
approved if they themselves prescribed it for that indication.68 This
underscores the potential risk of off-label uses, even if that risk is
unintentional, and emphasizes the need for the FDA to step in and oversee
drug prescribing practices.69
Proponents for imposing regulation go even further and claim that
the untested use of drugs is unethical and potentially unsafe. 70 After all,
isolated case reports published in peer–reviewed journals telling the
successes of unapproved uses cannot compare to controlled and rigorous
clinical trials and strict FDA scrutiny of the drug’s safety profile.71
A case in point is the increased risk of heart attack and stroke that
were brought about from Merck’s promotion of the off-label use of
rofecoxib (Vioxx) in treating rheumatoid arthritis, outside of its FDAapproved use for relieving pain.72 What makes the situation more
aggravating is that these risks were only discovered after widespread use
O’ Reilly and Dalal, supra note 26, at 305-06.
Radley et. al, supra note 25, at 1023.
68 Rick Nauert, Off-Label Use May Be Off-Track, PSYCH CENTRAL, (Aug. 24, 2009),
http://psychcentral.com/news/2009/08/24/off-label- use-may-be-off-track/7926.html.
69 Amy E. Todd, No Need for More Regulation: Payors and Their Role in Balancing the
Cost and Safety Considerations of Off-Label Prescriptions, 37 AM. J.L. & MED. 422, 426
(2011) (“[W]hile off-label prescribing can be very beneficial to some patients, this common
practice can also be unnecessary and, in some cases, very risky.”).
70 Steven R. Salbu, Off-Label Use, Prescription, and Marketing of FDA-Approved
Drugs: An Assessment of Legislative and Regulatory Policy, 51 FLA. L. REV. 181, 202 (1999).
71 See Charles Marwick, Implementing the FDA Modernization Act, 279 JAMA 815
(1998).
72 Stafford, supra note 16, at 1429; John Cairns, The Coxibs and Traditional
Nonsteroidal Anti-Inflammatory Drugs: A Current Perspective on Cardiovascular Risks,
23(2) CAN. J. CARDIO, 125 (2007).
66
67
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of the drug among patients who didn’t stand to benefit much from
choosing rofecoxib over the existing treatment of choice.73
There are other notorious examples where the use of off-label
medications have gone awry and caused more harm than good. The E1
prostaglandin analogue, Misoprostol, was approved in 1988 for the
prevention and treatment of gastric ulcers, but was later prescribed offlabel to induce labor for elective abortions.74 Unfortunately, it was later
found to cause uterine rupture in pregnant women.75 Thalidomide is
another tragic example; it was initially used as a sedative and was later
approved to treat leprosy, but it was also prescribed for off-label purposes
such as cancer and AIDS.76 It was found that when pregnant women
consumed the drug, their babies were born with severe and permanent
limb deformities.77 These examples serve to highlight the dangers of
permitting un-indicated uses of drugs that have not been approved by the
FDA.
B. Arguments Against Regulations
There is some force in the argument that science should dictate the
practice of medicine, not law. As Beck and Azari say, “[f]or a product to
have the most effective potential benefits, law and regulation. . .must
follow, not precede science.”78 It often takes a prolonged period of time
for regulations to be put in place because the FDA approval process is
notorious for being time-consuming, arduous and expensive.79 The
process for approval in 2000 was estimated to take between seven to ten
years.80 In practical terms, this means that medical discoveries in the field
of practice often happen at a faster pace than the FDA approval process.81
For instance, the approved use for aspirin was for pain relief as an anti-

73 Carolanne Dai, Randall
Stafford, Caleb Alexander, National Trends in
Cyclooxygenase-2 Inhibitor Use Since Market Release: Non-Selective Diffusion of a
Selectively Cost-Effective Innovation, 165 ARCHIVES OF INT’L MED. 171 (2005).
74 Dov Fox, Safety, Efficacy and Authenticity: The Gap Between Ethics and Law in FDA
Decisionmaking, 2005 MICH. S. L. REV.1135, 1168 (2005).
75 Id.
76 Shuang Zhou, Fengfei Wang, Tze-Chen Hsieh, Joseph Wu, Erxi Wu, Thalidomide – A
Notorious Sedative to a Wonder Anticancer Drug, 20 CURR MED CHEM 4102 (2014).
77 Fox, supra note 74, at 1168; see also Joseph G. Contrera, The Food and Drug
Administration and the International Conference on Harmonization: How Harmonious will
International Pharmaceutical Regulations Become?, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 927, 935 n.33
(1995).
78 James M. Beck & Elizabeth Azari, FDA, Off-Label Use, and Informed Consent:
Debunking Myths and Misconceptions, 53 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 71, 79 (1998).
79 O’ Reilly and Dalal, supra note 26, at 304.
80 O’ Reilly and Dalal, supra note 26, at 304.
81 Fox, supra note 74, at 1165.
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inflammatory drug but it was prescribed by physicians off-label for many
years to reduce the risk of heart attacks and it wasn’t until 1998 that the
FDA finally approved such use.82
Furthermore, while new additions may eventually be included on the
list of approved uses following a supplemental new drug application, this
is more of an exception than the norm. The FDA approval process is
immensely expensive and a recent study done by Tufts Centre for the
Study of Drug Development pegs the cost of developing a new drug that
ultimately gains market approval at $2.6 billion.83 As mentioned earlier,
drug companies either do not have the financial backing to do so and even
if they do, they have no incentives to carry out expensive trials that could
produce undesirable outcomes for their drugs and thus reduce profits.84
Given that there are minimal incentives for pharmaceutical companies to
push for FDA approval for off-label uses of drugs, it is not surprising that
the unapproved additions may never be added onto the label.
In treating patients, there are often many variations in clinical
histories and the best form of treatment for one patient with a condition
may not necessarily be the most ideal treatment of choice for a different
patient with the exact same condition. For physicians to act in the best
interest of the individual patient, the physician needs to have the freedom
to prescribe the most appropriate medication for that particular patient,
even if it is for a use that has not been approved. In fact, an off-label drug
is sometimes the first-line of therapy or the recommended drug in clinical
guidelines. In 1994, George Lundberg of the American Medical
Association said when he testified before Congress and stated,
“prescribing FDA-approved drugs for off-label uses often is necessary
for optimal patient care.”85 For a physician to be so restricted as to be
unable to prescribe what is appropriate or even necessary to treat the
patient would entail a regrettable step backwards and a clear, unwanted
intrusion into the practice of medicine.
Although, approved drugs for treating a medical condition may
exist, the current treatments available may be unsatisfactory. 86 There are
still many medical conditions for which we there is no cure, and these
conditions range from infectious diseases such as AIDS to hereditary

82

Peter J. Gross & Linda S. Svitak, Drug and Device Litigation in the 21st Century, 27
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 271, 286 (2000).
83 Cost to Develop and Win Marketing Approval for a New Drug Is $2.6 Billion, TUFTS
CENTRE FOR THE STUDY OF DRUG DEVELOPMENT, available at http://csdd.tufts.edu/news/
complete_story/pr_tufts_csdd_2014_cost_study (last visited Apr. 19, 2016).
84 Stafford, supra note 16, at 1427-28.
85 Beck & Azari, supra note 78, at 79.
86 Fox, supra note 74, at 1165.
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conditions such as cystic fibrosis and even cancer. 87 As a result, a
practitioner’s freedom to prescribe an off-label drug that is not approved
by the FDA has advantages: it drives innovation in clinical practice and
enables physicians to adopt new practices based on emerging clinical or
research evidence that may be insufficient for FDA approval or have yet
to be presented to FDA for approval. In doing so, physicians offer muchneeded hope to patients who have run out of viable approved options
amongst approved drugs.
A perfect example of an area of medicine in which patients and
physicians often must rely on innovative uses of off-label drugs is the
area of oncology. A drug may be approved to treat Cancer A but has not
been approved to treat Cancer B. If the principle of pathophysiology
behind both cancers is the same, as is the case with most cancers, it is
likely that the drug will also be of benefit to a patient afflicted with
Cancer B. Therefore, it is medically appropriate for physicians, in the
absence of other safe or effective options, to resort to a last ditch attempt
in prescribing these drugs for unapproved ways.88 In fact, the use of offlabel drugs in the field of oncology is so extensive that the American
Society of Oncology wrote a letter to the FDA in 1998 stating that “the
labeling of anticancer products frequently presents an incomplete or even
inaccurate picture of the current state of medical knowledge. . .for
virtually every cancer drug, appropriate medical usage differs from the
terms of the product labeling.”89
Another group of patients for whom off-label drugs may be life
savings are patients who suffer from “orphan” conditions.90 Federal Law
defines “orphan” diseases as those diseases that affect fewer than 200,000
Americans, including debilitating conditions such as Lou Gehrig’s
disease and cystic fibrosis.91 The expected profits to be gained from such
a small group of consumers is dwarfed by the anticipated costs of
conducting research and carrying out expensive clinical trials for
“orphan” conditions, which accounts for the reluctance of drug

87

Fox, supra note 74, at 1165.
Fox, supra note 74, at 1166.
89 Letter from John R. Durant, Executive Vice President, Am. Soc’y of Clinical
Oncology, to Michael A. Friedman, Acting Comm’r, FDA (July 21, 1998), available at
https://www.fda.gov/ohrms/DOCKETS/dockets/98n0222/c000039.pdf.
90 See O’Reilly and Dalal, supra note 26, at 305 (citing Karen Bradshaw, The Food and
Drug Administration Modernization and Accountability Act of 1997: Is It the Answer to the
Off-Label Advertising Debate?, 12 ANNALS OF HEALTH L. 295 (1998)).
91 See, e.g., I. Scott Bass et al., Off-Label Promotion: Is FDA’s Final Guidance on
Industry-Supported Scientific and Educational Programs Enforceable?, 53 FOOD & DRUG
L.J. 193 (1998).
88
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companies to invest in making drugs to treat these diseases.92 Hence, it
is hardly surprising that patients afflicted with orphan conditions rely
heavily on the use of off-label drugs, so much so that the Abbey Meyers,
President of the National Organization for Rare Diseases reports that
“90% of [such patients] must rely on ‘off-label uses to have any treatment
at all.’”93
It is understandably misleading to think that patient populations who
rely heavily on off-label drugs are restricted only to small, isolated
groups. Large patient populations such as pregnant women and children
are also immensely reliant on off-label use of drugs too. It is much more
tricky, problematic and expensive to conduct controlled clinical human
trials on children and pregnant women, and drug companies lack the
financial motivation to pursue such research.94 The American Academy
of Pediatrics estimates that 80% of drugs prescribed for children are being
prescribed for off-label uses.95
Without off-label drugs, these
significantly large patient populations will be left out in the cold without
any treatment at all.96
In light of these arguments, it becomes clear that the unethical
human experimentation objection to off-label drug use is severely
undermined, especially when one draws a distinction between medical
research and medical practice. Medical practice refers to the diagnosis
and treatment of the individual patient while medical research refers to
the general development of scientific knowledge of the human body, for
which tests must be carried out under strict controls and with patient’s
informed consent.97 Since off-label use often arises with the primary goal
of benefitting the individual patient, rather than the desire to advance the
general progress of scientific knowledge, it falls squarely into the field of
medical practice, not medical research.98 Bearing this in mind, the
objection to “unethical human experimentation” is less persuasive and
may even be misplaced.
There are also benefits that can be derived from lifting restrictions
O’ Reilly and Dalal, supra note 26, at 304.
Off-Label Drug Use and FDA Review of Supplemental Drug Applications, Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Human Resources and Intergovernmental Relations of the H. Comm.
on Government Reform and Oversight, 104th Cong. 1 (1996) (statement of Abbey S. Meyers,
President, Nat’l Org. of Rare Disorders).
94 Fox, supra note 74, at 1165.
95 Robert Levine, ETHICS AND REGULATION OF CLINICAL 241 (Yale U. Press, 2nd ed.
1986).
96 William L. Christopher, Off-Label Drug Prescription: Filling the Regulatory Vacuum,
48 FOOD AND DRUG L.J. 247, 248 (1993).
97 George J. Annas, Questing for Holy Grails: Duplicity, Betrayal and Self-Deception in
Postmodern Medical Research, 12 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 297, 323 (1996).
98 Fox, supra note 74, at 1169.
92
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on data sharing between drug companies and physicians. Precisely
because the use of off-label drugs is so widespread, the dissemination of
accurate information by drug companies can increase physicians’ access
to the most updated literature on these drugs, which in turn allows them
to provide the optimal care for their patients.99 Given advances in
information technology made in the last decade, physicians are finding it
increasingly difficult to keep abreast of the deluge of information that is
available in every medical journal regarding the efficacy of off-label uses
in treating a variety of conditions and there is the risk of physicians
missing out on a key study or crucial piece of research that may influence
his treatment choices.100 Having drug companies present physicians with
information on how and when to use a drug for un-indicated uses in a
concise and truthful manner may be beneficial for both patients and
physicians.101 The fear that pharmaceutical companies will insidiously
sway the minds of unknowing physicians with misleading information
can also be allayed. Physicians themselves believe that off-label
promotion to physicians should be without restrictions, in view of the
physicians’ general familiarity with the FDA–approval process and their
capability to independently assess the legitimacy of a drug
manufacturer’s claims.102 The Second Circuit in Caronia astutely
observed that “as off-label drug use itself is not prohibited, it does not
follow that prohibiting the truthful promotion of off-label drug usage
would. . . reduc[e] patient exposure to unsafe and ineffective drugs.”103
An explicit argument must be made for the autonomy of physicians
and for their freedom to practice medicine without undue interference
from the FDA. All the aforementioned arguments support this point
directly or indirectly, e.g. off-label drugs benefit patients’ and physicians’
act in the best interests of patients in their practice of medicine. As Beck
and Azari puts it succinctly, “if the physician’s considered professional
judgment is that a particular use of a particular product is the best
treatment for a particular patient, professional responsibility demands
that this course of treatment be followed.”104 In fact, physicians may be
guilty of malpractice if they fail to act according to the off-label standard

99 Gregory Conko, Hidden Truth: The Perils and Protections of Off-Label Drug and
Medical Device Promotion, 21 HEALTH MATRIX 149, 165 (2011).
100 Id. at 150 (“[Physicians not paid by a drug or device manufacturer] are free to tout to
benefits of off-label uses in any way to any listener.”).
101 Richard C. Ascroft, The Impact of the Washington Legal Foundation Cases on
Pharmaceutical Manufacturer Practices in the United States, 34 IND. L. REV. 95, 99 (2000).
102 Helm, supra note 36, at 153-154.
103 Caronia, 703 F.3d at 166.
104 Beck & Azari, supra note 78, at 100.
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of care.105 In 2007, the American Medical Association (“AMA”) passed
Resolution 918 that not only permits physicians to use off-label drugs,
but also encourages it when clinical evidence, expert consensus opinion,
or accepted standards of care support such uses.106 Furthermore, the
resolution calls for support for “the autonomous clinical decision making
authority of a physician.”107 Many in the medical community also adopt
this stance, and feel that the government should not hinder a physician’s
freedom to practice medicine when using an off-label drug is optimal for
patient care.108
V. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
Given the FDA’s dilemma in choosing to safeguard public safety
versus overstepping its boundaries and intervening with the practice of
medicine, there is merit in briefly exploring a few solutions that could
possibly address both of these concerns.
A. State Regulations
Unlike the FDA, states have traditionally been recognized to have
broad authority to regulate the practice of medicine in order to protect the
safety, health, and welfare of the people within the state.109 In contrast to
the skepticism that FDA faces for intervening with the practice of
medicine, states have always been able to exercise this authority in a
variety of ways; including adopting vaccination and quarantine laws, as
well as establishing modern licensing requirements for medical
practitioners.110 Courts have also upheld a broad range of state laws that
regulate the practice of medicine—making it clear that the states have the
authority to do so.111 Since regulating the practice of medicine is a space
that has always been reserved for states, states should be involved in
examining off-label prescribing practices.112 There is a caveat, however,
that different states must cooperate to ensure successful regulation of offlabel activity, or else state residents can choose to travel to other states
105 Margaret Z. Johns, Informed Consent: Requiring Doctors to Disclose Off-Label
Prescriptions and Conflicts of Interest, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 967, 969 (2007).
106 Zborowsky, supra note 43, at 939.
107 Zborowsky, supra note 43, at 939.
108 Zborowsky, supra note 43, at 939.
109 Patricia J. Zettler, Toward Coherent Federal Oversight of Medicine, 51 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 427, 446 (2015).
110 Noah, supra note 3, at 159.
111 Noah, supra note 3, at 159.
112 Amy E. Todd, No Need for More Regulation: Payors and Their Role in Balancing the
Cost and Safety Considerations of Off-Label Prescriptions, 37 AM. J.L. & MED. 422, 429
(2011).
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with fewer restrictions; hence, defeating the goal of implementing statebased restrictions.113
B. Drugs Not Approved in United States
Another option that can be explored but has not yet gained much
traction is for the FDA to speed up approval of new indications of drugs
that have already been approved in other countries.
The European equivalent of the FDA is the European Medicines
Agency, and pharmaceutical companies have to satisfy both the different
approval processes set out by both the EMA and the FDA in order for
new drugs to be marketed in the European Union and the United States
respectively.114 This can be costly, duplicative, and time consuming.
There has been academic debate calling for the cooperation of both the
FDA and EMA to streamline and align the approval processes, which will
facilitate drug development and allow for quicker (and less expensive)
access without necessarily compromising the safety and efficacy of
drugs.115
Even if the approval processes in both agencies were to remain
different, there is value in permitting the use of drugs that have been
approved by either agency (i.e. reciprocity), consequently reducing delay
or the waste of duplicated resources.116 A case of meningitis outbreak in
Princeton in 2013 highlights the feasibility of reciprocity: seven cases of
the type B strain were diagnosed in Princeton, and while there exists a
vaccine (Bexsero) for treatment of the outbreak the FDA has yet to
approve its use.117 This same vaccine has been approved by EMA since
January 2013 and is available in Europe and Australia, and after lobbying
by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the FDA gave special
permission to import and use the vaccine.118 In fact, reciprocity is the
major premise behind a bill introduced by Senator Ted Cruz and Mike
Lee, “Reciprocity Ensures Streamlined Use of Lifesaving Treatments Act

113

Zborowsky, supra note 43, at 94.
The FDA and Slower Cures, W.S.J. (Feb. 28, 2011), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB
10001424052748703766704576009512990553104.
115 Lynn Howie et al, A Comparision of FDA and EMA Approval: Implications for Drug
Development and Cost of Care, 27 ONCOLOGY 1195, 1195 (2013).
116 Reform Options, FDAREVIEW.ORG, http://www.fdareview.org/09_reform.php#3 (last
visited Apr. 20, 2016).
117 Paul Howard and Yevgeniy Feyman, If a Drug Is Good Enough for Europeans, It’s
Good Enough for Us, HEALTH AFFAIRS BLOG (Feb. 14, 2014), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/
2014/02/14/if-a-drug-is-good-enough-for-europeans-its-good-enough-for-us/.
118 Conor Friedersdorf, Ted Cruz’s Best Idea for Overhauling The FDA, THE ATLANTIC
(Dec. 18, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/12/ted-cruzs-best-ideafor-overhauling-the-fda/421158/.
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of 2015.” The proposed bill will allow for “reciprocal marketing
approval of [drugs]. . . that are authorized to be lawfully marketed
abroad” in a list of selected countries.119 There have also been previous
bills, such as Speeding Access to Already Approved Pharmaceutical Act,
that attempt to tackle this “drug lag”. 120
Legislation which aim to push for approval or the speeding up of
approval of new indications of drugs already approved in other countries,
such as the bill discussed above, is a feasible measure that warrants more
attention.
C. FDA to Explore Other Options
Instead of viewing the FDA as an opposing regulatory body whose
sole aim is to set up indiscriminate barriers for the use of off-label drugs
at every turn, it is worthwhile looking to the FDA to adopt a role where
it works alongside physicians and pharmaceutical companies to ensure
that consumers derive the maximum benefit from off-label uses. For
instance, the FDA may consider taking it upon itself to collect postmarketing data from users in a methodical manner to assess and balance
harms and benefits of off-label uses. Alternatively, the FDA can collate
and analyze existing evidence from any reliable non-randomized
controlled clinical trial before distributing its findings to practitioners. 121
As the Second Circuit in Caronia suggested, there are many
regulatory mechanisms other than restricting speech that FDA could
impose to advance its interests—e.g. providing guidance to doctors and
patients to help differentiate misleading and inaccurate promotion from
truthful information; developing disclaimer systems to warn consumers
and providers; developing “safety tiers within the off-label market. . . to
distinguish between drugs”; or making it mandatory for drug
manufacturers to list all anticipated indications when they first submit a
new drug for the approval process—which could “enabl[e] physicians,
the government and patients to track a drug’s development.”122 The last
suggestion has also been echoed by critics like Stafford, in the hope that
this will preempt any attempt on the part of pharmaceutical companies to
circumvent the rigorous testing process for what is most likely the

119

BILL FOR RECIPROCITY ENSURES STREAMLINED USE OF LIFESAVING TREATMENT ACTS
http://www.cruz.senate.gov/files/documents/Bills/20151211_FDA.pdf.
120 Alexander Gaffney, Bill Wants Drugs Approved in Europe to be Available More
Quickly to US Patients, REGULATOR AFFAIRS PROFESSIONAL SOCIETY (Mar. 20, 2015),
http://www.raps.org/Regulatory-Focus/News/2015/03/20/21778/Bill-Wants-DrugsApproved-in-Europe-to-be-Available-More-Quickly-to-US-Patients/.
121 Stafford, supra note 16, at 1429.
122 Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, at 167-68.
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primary use.123
VI. CONCLUSION
There is no easy solution to the existing dilemma of how FDA can
strike a balance between safeguarding public safety and respecting
physicians’ autonomy to practice medicine freely without any
intervention. This article has highlighted the numerous arguments
supporting, as well as resisting the implementation of regulations by the
FDA. Fortunately, there exist a few solutions that we can explore in
isolation or combination to help address this dilemma; such as looking
into allowing EMA-approved indications to be applied here in the U.S.
or speeding up the FDA approval process. It remains to be seen if the
aforementioned suggestions will ever gain sufficient traction to achieve
tangible outcomes, but it is important nonetheless to encourage
intellectual discourse in this area, with the hope that patients can benefit
from the even the smallest steps taken in the right direction.

123

Stafford, supra note 16, at 1429.

